W e address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers. Each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities, and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. To design truthful double-auction mechanisms, we propose a novel "padding" method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget. To the best of our knowledge, this "padding" method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balanced, and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment. Furthermore, these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle/single-unit mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a growing number of transactions in Internet marketplaces, and this has generated great interest in online auctions in the academic research communities (Pinker et al. 2003) . Most procurement e-markets feature numerous auctions hosted by single buyers (e.g., Gallien and Wein 2005) . Although one-sided auctions are well suited for markets with a limited number of buyers, these mechanisms impose a formidable computational burden on sellers when the markets consist of numerous buyers and sellers (e.g., the agribusiness market and the energy market). To maximize profit, a potential seller may bid repeatedly in various auctions, and he has to contemplate the possible outcomes of the auctions hosted by different buyers. This computational burden hinders the trades, especially in combinatorial auctions (de Vries and Vohra 2003, Pekeč and Rothkopf 2003) . 1 To relieve this computational burden and promote transactions, much recent research has been devoted to the double-auction design, which embraces multiple buyers and sellers all at once. For various exchange environments, McAfee (1992) , Huang et al. (2002) , Babaioff and Walsh (2003) , Babaioff et al. (2004) , and Shen (2006, 2008) provide truthful, or strategy-proof, double-auction mechanisms under which bidding the true valuation is each agent's best strategy. Nevertheless, these mechanisms cannot be applied to the bundle/multiunit market in which each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. For such a market, Guo et al. (2007) propose an iterative double-auction based on the decomposition scheme (also see Fan et al. 2003) , whereas Jain and Varaiya (2006) propose an oneshot combinatorial seller's bid double-auction. Given these mechanisms, both papers study the agents' bidding behavior. Guo et al. (2007 Guo et al. ( , p. 1356 further comment on the difficulty of designing a truthful mechanism: "An alternative is to design direct revelation mechanisms to induce agents to truthful bidding. Such methods have largely failed in simple contexts (Jennergren and Muller 1973, Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983) , let alone complex setting such as ours." This paper is devoted to filling this void by providing truthful double-auction mechanisms that support bundle synergy, enable straightforward decision making, and promote sufficiently many transactions. When calculating the buying prices, we introduce a fictitious buyer who intensifies the competition on the buyer side and intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement. Ultimately, this padding enables us to design budget-balanced, strategy-proof doubleauction mechanisms. We further show that by carefully selecting the padding, these mechanisms dominate the known strategy-proof bundle/singleunit mechanisms in both social welfare and agents' payoffs when each seller only supplies a single unit of one commodity. Given a mechanism, a self-interested agent maximizes its (quasilinear) utility, which is the difference between the valuation and the amount of money transferred if the agent trades and zero otherwise. A practical auction mechanism needs to be individually rational and budget-balanced. A mechanism is (ex post) individually rational if each agent has a bidding strategy that guarantees a nonnegative utility regardless of the behavior of the other agents. A mechanism is (ex post weakly) budget balanced if the auctioneer's payoff (i.e., money collected from the buyers minus the payout to the sellers) is nonnegative regardless of the behavior of the agents. Thus, individual rationality draws the potential buyers and sellers, whereas budget balance motivates the auctioneer to hold the auction.
To promote the transactions and attract both buyers and sellers in the long run, we focus on efficiencymaximizing mechanisms that maximize the social welfare-i.e., the summation of the auctioneer's payoff and each agent's utility. A mechanism is efficient if the allocation maximizes social welfare. A weaker notion is asymptotic efficiency, which means that the welfare loss under the mechanism compared with the maximal social welfare converges to zero as maximal social welfare approaches infinity. In this paper, we propose strategy-proof, individually rational, budgetbalanced, and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the bundle/multiunit exchange environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we review the double-auction design literature. In §3, we propose the "padding" method, a general framework to design truthful double-auction mechanisms. In §4, we propose the linear-program-based padding mechanism when each buyer only asks for a specific bundle. We then investigate the case when buyers may be interested in multiple bundles, and we propose the integer-program-based padding mechanism in §5. We evaluate the efficiency of the mechanisms in §6 and conclude in §7.
Related Literature
The most well-known, strategy-proof mechanism is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 1961 , Clarke 1971 , Groves 1973 , in which the allocation is efficient and the agent's utility equals its incremental contribution to the overall system, which is the difference between the social welfare with the agent's participation and the social welfare without it. The VCG mechanism is strategy proof, individually rational, and efficient.
Nevertheless, the VCG double-auction mechanism is not budget-balanced. Furthermore, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that it is impossible to implement an efficient, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism even for a simple exchange environment. As a result, most research has focused on the asymptotically efficient mechanisms that host sufficiently many transactions.
Trade Reduction Method
Early truthful double-auction mechanisms adopt the trade reduction method under which the allocation is determined by removing trades from the efficient allocation and the buying and selling prices are determined by the highest losing bid by the buyers and the lowest losing bid by the sellers, respectively. The trade-reduction method recognizes that one can establish a strategy-proof and budget-balanced mechanism by selecting a subset of trades that would be executed in an efficient allocation.
Using this idea, McAfee (1992) proposes a strategyproof mechanism for a simple exchange environment in which multiple buyers and sellers exchange single units of the same commodity. Huang et al. (2002) employ a rationing technique to design a strategyproof mechanism for a multi-unit exchange environment with a single type of commodity. Babaioff and Walsh (2003) propose the strategy-proof known single-minded trade reduction (KSM-TR) mechanism for the bundle/single-unit environment under which each buyer asks for a bundle of various commodities and each seller supplies a single unit of one commodity. Babaioff et al. (2004) propose a truthful tradereduction mechanism for a simple exchange environment in which agents live in numerous markets and transportation costs are incurred for transactions between the markets. Gonen et al. (2007) propose a generalized trade-reduction procedure that iteratively removes trades.
To illustrate this method, consider a bundle/singleunit market with three buyers, five sellers, and one commodity. Buyer 1 wants two units of the commodity at a per-unit price of $4; buyers 2 and 3 want one unit at $3 and $2, respectively. The five sellers each offer one unit at price $1. Assume all of the agents bid their true valuations. The trade-reduction mechanism first solves the efficient allocation under which all three buyers trade. Starting from this allocation, the mechanism removes the trading buyer with lowest bid for each bundle preference-i.e., the mechanism removes buyer 1 (the lowest bidder for two-unit bundle) and buyer 3 (the lowest bidder for one-unit bundle), and leaves buyer 2 the only trading buyer in the allocation. The selling price is $1 because the lowest bid of the nontrading sellers is $1 and the buying price of buyer 2 is $2, the bid price of buyer 3. The auctioneer's payoff is 2 − 1 = $1, and no agent can benefit from misreporting its true valuation.
Shadow Price Method
Because the buying price is set to be the highest losing bid by the buyers with the same bundle preference, a buyer does not trade if no one else desires the same bundle under the trade reduction method. To tackle this problem, Chu and Shen (2008) propose the strategy-proof buyer competition LP (BC-LP) and modified buyer competition (MBC) mechanisms, which determine the buying prices by a shadow price method.
Under this method, the mechanisms first sets the buying price for each buyer to be her bid price minus her minimum shadow price in the linear relaxation of the welfare-maximization integer programming formulation. That is, the buyer's utility is her marginal contribution, similar to the VCG mechanism. Then all of the buyers who bid higher than their buying prices become the trading buyers and trade according to the efficient allocation among the trading buyers and original sellers. The selling price of each trading seller is set to be his ask price plus his maximum shadow price in the linear relaxation of the welfaremaximization formulation among the trading buyers and original sellers.
Let us revisit the bundle/single-unit example. Recall that buyer 1 wants two units at a per-unit price of $4; buyers 2 and 3 want one unit at $3 and $2, respectively. The five sellers each offer one unit at price $1. Assume all of the agents bid their true valuations. At the optimal solution to the linear relaxation formulation, all of the buyers acquire their bundles. The buyer who has a higher bid price has a higher shadow price. For any buyer, the per-unit buying price equals the marginal cost to acquire one more unit, which is $1 and is lower than her bid. Thus, all of the buyers trade in the allocation, and the per-unit buying price is $1 for all of the buyers. With all of the buyers trading, the marginal price for the commodity is again $1 from the sellers' perspective. Therefore, the selling price is $1 for all of the sellers and the auctioneer's payoff is zero. For any buyer, she trades at price $1 as long as she bids a per-unit price higher than $1 and she does not trade if her bid is lower than $1. For any seller, he sells at price $1 if his bid is lower than $1 and he does not sell if his bid is higher than $1. No agent can benefit from misreporting its true valuation.
Potential Budget Deficit
The single-output restriction-i.e., each seller only supplies a single unit of one commodity-is assumed by the KSM-TR, BC-LP, and MBC mechanisms. When a seller offers multiple units, the single-item results do not carry over in multiple-unit settings (e.g., Harstad 1994, Bapna et al. 2002) , and a straightforward extension of these truthful mechanisms is not budget balanced.
To illustrate this point, let us modify the above bundle/single-unit example so that instead of five sellers each offering one unit at price $1, three sellers offer one unit at price $1 and one seller offers two units at a per-unit price of $1. The buyer side remains the same: buyer 1 wants two units at a per-unit price of $4; buyers 2 and 3 want one unit at $3 and $2, respectively.
Assume all of the agents bid their true valuations. If the above shadow price method is adopted, all of the buyers should trade at a per-unit price of $1. We will show that the seller with two units has a per-unit selling price greater than $1 and has a positive utility if the mechanism is strategy proof and individually rational. Because all other selling prices are no less than $1 under an individually rational mechanism, the auctioneer faces a deficit.
To understand that the seller with two units has a positive utility, consider the case in which this seller asks for a per-unit price of x between $1 and $2 when all other agents bid truthfully. According to the shadow price method, the marginal cost to acquire one more unit is now x, which is lower than any buyer's bid. All of the buyers trade, and the seller with two units can sell at least one unit at a price no lower than x and obtain a positive utility under an individually rational mechanism. This seller enjoys at least the same positive utility if he bids truthfully under a strategy-proof mechanism.
Padding Method
To recover this deficit, we propose a "padding" method that introduces a gap Q = Q c c∈C between supply availability and demand requirement for the commodities set C. The gap can be viewed as resulting from a phantom competitor: a buyer with bundle preference Q c c∈C and unlimited budget. If the agents only exchange a single type of commodity, this phantom buyer essentially shifts the demand curve to the right as shown in Figure 1 for an atomless market.
As illustrated by Figure 1 , the new equilibrium price will be a little higher due to padding. If we set the buying price at this higher equilibrium price, the transaction quantity may shrink a little bit. Given a smaller transaction quantity, the selling price is a little lower than the original equilibrium price as well. Therefore, padding enables a budget surplus. This idea can be carried through to an atomic market with finite agents and bundle requirements. In general, a padding mechanism will have the following steps.
• Define padding-i.e., a phantom buyer with certain bundle preference and unlimited budget.
• Solve the social welfare maximization problem or its proxy taking into account of padding. • Each buyer's buying price is set to the threshold bidding price at which she secures her bundle in the padded optimization problem. All buyers who bid higher than their buying prices become the trading buyers in the final allocation.
• Given the trading buyer set, allocation is determined by matching these buyers with the most efficient sellers. Typically, this allocation may be found by solving the social welfare maximization problem with the trading buyers and the original sellers.
• Examine whether a threshold ask price exists for each item of each seller such that the item is traded if and only if his ask price is below this threshold. If so, this threshold price is the selling price of this item and we have a strategy-proof double-auction mechanism.
The auctioneer has the freedom to choose the padding. A large padding that results in fierce competition on both sides is more likely to generate a truthful mechanism and a budget surplus. Nevertheless, the transaction quantity may be suboptimal due to padding and the associated social welfare loss is roughly proportional to the padding size. We show that the padding size needs not to be too large, and it is possible to design asymptotically efficient mechanisms in which the absolute size of the allocation inefficiency is bounded; hence the relative inefficiency goes to zero as the market grows and the maximal social welfare goes to infinity.
This padding intuition is likely applicable to many exchange environments. Nevertheless, detailed padding mechanism needs to be constructed for each exchange environment of interest. In this paper, we will focus on the bundle/multiunit exchange environment in which each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. Using various formulations, strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balanced, and asymptotically efficient doubleauction mechanisms are constructed by carefully specifying the padding. Furthermore, the mechanisms proposed here are not extensions of the strategyproof bundle/single-unit mechanisms: we show in §6 that a class of the padding mechanisms dominates the known strategy-proof bundle/single-unit mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.
Linear-Program-Based
Padding Mechanism 4.1. Model Let I denote the group of buyers, and J the group of sellers. Let C denote the set of indivisible commodities. We consider the following market in which buyer i i ∈ I wants to purchase a bundle of commodities q c i c∈C and seller j j ∈ J supplies a single commodity c j ∈C up to q j units. That is, we follow the known single-minded assumption (Lehmann et al. 2002 , Ledyard 2007 , which assumes that the bundle preference q c i c∈C is common knowledge. The quantity information q j is also assumed to be common knowledge.
Let f i be the bid price of buyer i for her bundle, and let g j be the ask price per unit of seller j for commodity c j . If all of the agents bid truthfully, the maximal social welfare V I J can be solved by the following integer program:
where x i denotes whether buyer i trades in the allocation and y j denotes the transaction quantity of seller j.
The variables x i y j (i ∈ I, j ∈ J ) specify the resource allocation.
Mechanism
The optimization problem is NP-hard because the winner-determination problem in combinatorial auctions is a special case of I J . To design a computationally efficient mechanism, we resort to its linear relaxation formulation I J :
2 Because formulations I J and I J may have multiple optimal solutions, we apply the following perturbation technique to select a single solution among all of the optimal solutions. For notational simplicity, let us index the buyers by i k , k = 1 2 I ; and index the sellers by j k , k = 1 2 J . A perturbation factor is introduced into each agent's bid-that is, we treat their bids as f i k + i k and g j k − j k , where 1
Now, we define the trading prices using the padding idea based on the linear relaxation formulations. The resulting mechanism is called the linear-programbased (LPB) padding mechanism. One immediate benefit of this mechanism is that it can be implemented in polynomial time.
The procedure of the LPB padding mechanism is as follows:
• Calculate the padding for each commodity c ∈ C, Q c = Q c q c i c∈C i∈I q j j∈J , a nonnegative function of the supply and demand quantities. Let the padding vector Q = Q c c∈C .
• Collect the bids from the agents.
• Solve the following linear program with buyer set I, seller set J , and padding Q:
DenoteĨ as the set of buyers with x i = 1 in the optimal solution specified by the perturbation method. The trading price for buyer i is p i I J Q , the infimum of bid price f i such that x i = 1 in the optimal solution to I J Q . We callĨ the trading buyer set because we will show that buyer i trades if and only if i ∈Ĩ.
• Solve the following linear program with buyer setĨ and seller set J :
Trade according to its optimal solution specified by the perturbation method. The revenue for seller j is the VCG payment, g j y j + V Ĩ J − V Ĩ J \ j . We will show that this revenue is equal to 
Example
Let us consider an example to better illustrate the LPB padding mechanism. Assume that there are four buyers, seven sellers, and two types of commodities A and B as shown in Figure 2 . Buyers 1 and 2 want one unit of commodity A at price $9, buyer 3 wants one unit of B at price $2, and buyer 4 wants two units of A and four units of B at price $18. Seller 1 offers two units of commodity A at a per-unit price of $1; sellers 2, 3, and 4 offer one unit of A at prices of $2, $3, and $4, respectively; sellers 5, 6, and 7 each offer one unit of B at a price of $1. In the LPB padding mechanism, we first decide the function for the padding vector; for example, we may choose the padding vector such that Q c = q c J , where q c J ≡ max q j j ∈ J c = c j , the size of the largest supply of commodity c from a single seller. With padding function Q c = q c J , the padding is two for commodity A and one for commodity B.
In the next step, we collect the bids. Let us first evaluate the allocation when all of the agents bid truthfully, then investigate the strategic behavior of the agents.
When all of the agents bid truthfully, buyers 1 and 2 acquire their bundles and buyer 4 acquires one half of her bundle, whereas all of the sellers exhaust their supplies in the optimal solution to I J Q . The trading buyer set consists of buyers 1 and 2. The trading price for both buyers 1 and 2 is $4, which is equal to the highest ask price for commodity A, because if they bid lower than $4 they do not trade in the optimal solution to I J Q . Given that the trading buyer set is buyers 1 and 2, seller 1 is the only trading seller according to the optimal solution to Ĩ J .
Seller 1 sells both of his units, and his VCG compen-sation is $5. The auctioneer receives a total of $8 from buyers 1 and 2 and pays $5 to seller 1. To investigate the strategic behavior on the buyer side, consider what happens if buyer 1 changes her bid. If buyer 1 bids less than $4, she does not trade in the optimal solution to I J Q , and consequently she does not trade in the allocation. If buyer 1 bids more than $4, she acquires her bundle in the optimal solution to I J Q , and she trades in a lesscompetitive environment Ĩ J at price $4. $4 is a critical threshold for buyer 1, who wins the bundle at $4 if she bids higher than $4 and loses the bundle if she bids lower. Therefore, buyer 1 essentially faces a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer at $4, and so bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy for her.
The strategic behavior on the seller side is more complicated because a seller's ask price may influence the trading buyer setĨ, which determines the seller's final payoff. Depending on the ask price of seller 1, we can have three different trading buyer sets I:Ĩ consists of buyers 1 and 2 if seller 1's ask price per unit is less than $6;Ĩ consists of buyers 1, 2, and 3 if the ask price is between $6 and $9; andĨ consists of buyers 1 and 3 if the ask price is more than $9. When seller 1 reports his true valuation one, the VCG compensation of seller 1, $5, is the summation of the ask prices from the two runner-up sellers, seller 2 and seller 3. As long as he asks for less than $3, the trading buyer set is buyers 1 and 2, and seller 1 essentially faces a nonuniform price scheme, under which he can sell his first unit at $3 and his second unit at $2. To see this, notice that seller 1 sells both units and receives $5 as long as he asks for less than $2 per unit. If seller 1's ask price is between $2 and $3, both seller 1 and seller 2 now sell one unit of A under the optimal solution to Ĩ J , and the VCG compensation is $3-seller 3's ask price-for both of them. If seller 1's ask price is above $3, seller 1 does not trade in the allocation whenĨ consists of buyers 1 and 2. When seller 1 asks for more than $6 per unit and I varies, seller 1 does not trade in the allocation. Figure 3 summarizes the findings and shows a critical insight: when a seller's ask price is low and he trades in the allocation, the trading buyer set does not vary with his ask price.
Properties
The investigation of the previous example sheds light on how we can establish the properties of the mechanism. We first realize that buyer i essentially faces a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer at price p i I J Q . Therefore, when buyer i's valuation is higher than p i I J Q , she prefers to trade, which can be achieved by bidding truthfully; when her valuation is lower than p i I J Q , she prefers not to trade, which can also be achieved by bidding truthfully; and when her valuation equals p i I J Q , she is indifferent to trading. Bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy for the buyers.
Because the LPB padding mechanism assigns an allocation according to the optimal solution to formulation Ĩ J , it is important to check that we reach an integral allocation in which no partial bundle or commodity is exchanged. The following theorem shows that the allocation is always integral.
Theorem 2. The LPB padding mechanism induces an integral allocation in which each buyer either acquires the whole bundle or nothing and each seller trades discrete units of the commodities.

Proof of Theorem 2. If i ∈ I\Ĩ, buyer i does not trade. If i ∈Ĩ, buyer i acquires her whole bundle at the solution to
Ĩ J by the proof of Theorem 1. Therefore, at the optimal solution to Ĩ J , i∈Ĩ q c i , an integer number of units of commodity c is acquired. Given the perturbation, we have a unique way to rank all of the supplies according to their ask prices from low to high, and each seller trades discrete units of the commodities.
The strategy proofness on the seller side and the budget-balance properties of the LPB padding mechanism depends on the size of the padding function Q c . Formally, we have the following theorem. With the padding function Q c ≤ q c J − 1, the buyer acquires her unit in the optimal solution to I J Q as long as she bids no less than $1. The buying price is $1, and the VCG payment of the seller is $2. The LPB padding mechanism is not budget balanced.
Integer-Program-Based Padding Mechanism
Model
In the previous section, we considered an exchange environment following the single-minded assumption-i.e., each buyer wants to purchase a specific bundle. Now, we consider a more general exchange environment in which each buyer values different bundles at different prices and tries to acquire one of the many possible bundles of commodities.
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We will continue to use I, J , and C to denote the group of buyers, the group of sellers, and the set of indivisible commodities, respectively. Let B be the index set of all the possible bundles of interest-i.e., 
Mechanism
A straightforward extension of the LPB padding mechanism that selects trading buyer i based on whether x b i = 1 for some b ∈ B is not strategy proof because buyer i's bid on one of the bundles may block x b i from becoming one for other bundles due to the constraint b∈B x b i ≤ 1. Consider an example in which buyer i is willing to buy a large quantity of a rare commodity at an extremely high price. Given a limited supply of this commodity, this bundle can only be fulfilled partially. If buyer i reveals her extremely high valuation on this rare commodity, the linear relaxation formulation guarantees that this bundle is partially fulfilled and essentially deprives buyer i of any opportunity to be a trading buyer. Therefore, buyers may be better off by misreporting their valuations on one bundle in order to increase the chance of getting another bundle entirely.
Although the LPB padding mechanism cannot be applied directly in this environment, the padding idea still prevails. Now we define the trading prices based on integer programs, and the resulting mechanism is called the integer-program-based (IPB) padding mechanism.
The procedure of the IPB padding mechanism is as follows:
• • Collect the bids from the agents.
• Solve the following integer program with buyer set I, seller set J , and padding Q: Trade according to its optimal solution specified by the perturbation method. The revenue for trading
The buying price of buyer i is her VCG price taking into account the padding Q. For buyer i ∈Ĩ, she acquires her bundle b i in the allocation. The revenue of seller j is his VCG compensation under Ĩ J less his VCG payoff at ask price p j I J Q . As we will see in the proof, p j I J Q is a critical price such that seller j does not trade and receives a zero payoff if he asks more than p j I J Q . By imposing a tariff equal to the VCG payoff at ask price p j I J Q , the mechanism guarantees a zero payoff for seller j at this critical price. I for all commodities c ∈ C. The detailed proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 and is available in the online appendix, which is provided in the e-companion. 
Example
Let us consider an example to better illustrate the IPB padding mechanism. Assume that there are one buyer, five sellers, and two types of commodities A and B as shown in Figure 4 . Buyer 1 wants either two units of commodity A at price $9 or one unit of commodity B at $3. Seller 1 offers two units of commodity A at a per-unit price of $1; sellers 2 and 3 offer one unit of A at prices of $2 and $4, respectively; sellers 4 and 5 each offer one unit of B at a price of $1.
In the IPB padding mechanism, we first decide the function for the padding vector. For example, we may choose the padding vector such that Q c = max q c J q c I . With this padding function, the padding is two for commodity A and one for commodity B.
With this padding, buyer 1 can acquire two units of A at price $6 or one unit of B at price $1 if all of the sellers bid truthfully. Acquiring two units of A at price $6 maximizes buyer 1's utility, and she can achieve this by submitting her true valuation. Seller 1 trades with buyer 1 in the allocation. When we solve Ĩ J and only consider buyer 1's bid on commodity A, the VCG compensation of seller 1 is 4 + 2 = $6-that is, seller 1 can sell his first unit at price $4 and his second Buyer Sellers unit at price $2. Nevertheless, the IPB padding mechanism sets a revenue of $5 = 3 + 2. That is, seller 1 can sell his first unit at price $3 and the second unit at price $2. The reason is that if seller 1 bids more than $3, buyer 1 acquires one unit of B instead of two units of A and seller 1 does not trade. If seller 1 can sell his first unit at price $4, he has incentive to lower his ask price to between $2 and $3 if his true valuation is between $3 and $4. By charging a fixed tariff of $1 from the standard VCG payoff when seller 1 trades, we keep the unit price no more than $3 and guarantee a zero payoff for seller 1 if his valuation is $3. By this way, we can establish the strategy proofness of the IPB padding mechanism.
Efficiency Analysis
We evaluate the efficiency performance of the padding mechanisms in this section. First, we demonstrate that the mechanisms are asymptotically efficient-i.e., almost all feasible surplus will actually be realized as the maximal social welfare approaches infinity. Then, we compare the padding mechanisms with other known truthful mechanisms under which the buyers acquire bundles of commodities. We show that a class of the padding mechanisms dominates these known mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.
Asymptotical Property
In this section, we focus on the IPB padding mechanism. The same logic applies to the LPB padding mechanism, and we provide the details on the LPB padding mechanism in the online appendix. To evaluate the efficiency of the padding mechanism, we need to specify the attributes of the underlying market.
Assume that there are a finite number of possible commodities c ∈ C and that there exists a number M such that q c b ≤ M for every bundle b and q j ≤ M for every seller j. That is, M is the limit of how many units of commodity c a buyer can acquire or a seller can supply. Let valuations of the bundles and goods be drawn according to some distributions with support contained in 0 a for some constant a.
We show that if we specify the integer padding function Q c solely based on M, the IPB padding mechanism is asymptotically efficient. This is achieved by realizing that the efficiency loss from a fixed padding Q is bounded. Therefore, as the auction becomes large and the maximal social welfare goes to infinity, almost all feasible social welfare will be realized. To simplify the presentation and eliminate the technical discussion of the feasibility of I J Q given a large Q, we assume that we have enough sellers to provide all types of commodities at price a so that I J Q is always feasible. These fictitious sellers do not trade in the allocation according to the optimal solution to Ĩ J because no buyer has valuation greater than a. 
Lemma 2. The efficiency loss is bounded for the IPB padding mechanism given a fixed padding Q (defined by M).
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, V I J Q ≥ V I J − a c∈C Q c by reducing Q unit by unit. Furthermore, notice that the social welfare realized, V Ĩ J ≥ V I J Q . Therefore, the efficiency loss V I J − V Ĩ J is bounded by a c∈C Q c , which is a constant for a fixed padding Q.
Theorem 6. With bounded valuation distributions, the IPB padding mechanism is asymptotically efficient given a fixed padding Q (defined by M).
Proof of Theorem 6. By Lemma 2, the efficiency loss is bounded.
As the auction becomes large and the maximal social welfare goes to infinity, the ratio between realized social welfare and maximal social welfare goes to one. The IPB padding mechanism is therefore asymptotically efficient.
Efficiency Comparison
The only known truthful mechanisms under which the buyers acquire bundles of commodities are the KSM-TR mechanism (Babaioff and Walsh 2003) , the BC-LP mechanism (Chu and Shen 2008) , and the MBC mechanism.
In this section, we define a class of the LPB padding mechanisms that dominates the BC-LP mechanism with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices. A class of the modified LPB padding mechanisms dominates the MBC mechanism, and we provide the detailed proof of this in the online appendix.
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All of the KSM-TR, BC-LP, and MBC mechanisms assume the single-output restriction, which is that each seller only supplies a single unit of one commodity (i.e., q c J = 1 for all c ∈ C). This means any LPB padding mechanism with positive padding is strategy proof, individually rational, and (weakly) budget balanced.
We define a class of limit LPB padding mechanisms by letting the padding function Q c s of the various commodities uniformly approach q c J − 1 c ∈ C (i.e., zero under the single-output restriction). For each "approaching direction," the behavior of the LPB padding mechanisms converges, and these mechanisms offer the same allocation and prices when the padding is sufficiently small.
The procedure of the limit LPB padding mechanism is as follows:
• Pick an arbitrary positive limit vector q = q c c∈C (i.e., approaching direction), where q c > 0 for all c ∈ C.
• Calculate q c J = max q j j ∈ J c = c j , the size of the largest supply of commodity c from a single seller.
• Solve the following parametric linear program with Q = q J − 1 + q for small > 0:
There exists¯ such that the optimal solution is x i + x i y j + y j for 0 < <¯ (Bazaraa et al. 1990 ). LetĨ denote the set of buyers with x i = 1 and x i = 0 in the optimal solution. In other words,Ĩ is the set of buyers with x i = 1 in the optimal solution to I J q J − 1 + q when 0 < <¯ . The trading price for buyer i is p i I J q J − 1 + q , the infimum of bid price f i such that x i = 1 in the optimal solution to I J q J − 1 + q when 0 < <¯ . We show that p i I J q J − 1 + q is a constant for 0 < <¯ . 7 We callĨ the trading buyer set because we will show that buyer i trades if and only if i ∈Ĩ.
Trade according to the optimal solution to Ĩ J . The revenue for seller j is the VCG payment,
The limit LPB padding mechanism is equivalent to the LPB padding mechanism with padding q c with sufficiently small > 0. The formal proofs on the convergence, strategy proofness, individual rationality, and (weak) budget balance are provided in the appendix.
Under the BC-LP mechanisms, the transaction price of a buyer is set to the threshold price at which an additional buyer with the same preference contributes to the total system welfare. When no transaction costs exist, the BC-LP mechanism can be implemented by the following procedure:
• Solve I J . Calculate p i I J , the minimum shadow price of the constraint x i ≤ 1 for seller i such that x i = 1 in the optimal solution to I J . LetĨ denote the set of buyers with p i I J > 0, and let the trading price for buyer i be f i − p i I J .Ĩ is the trading buyer set.
• Solve Ĩ J and trade according to its optimal solution. The revenue for seller j's unit is the VCG payment,
When calculating the buying price of a particular buyer, the BC-LP mechanism behaves as if it is assigning a small padding proportional to the bundle that is desired by this buyer. Under the limit LPB padding mechanism, a sufficiently small padding is used to calculate the buying prices for all of the buyers. It turns out that by adopting a sufficiently small common padding, the limit LPB padding mechanism offers lower buying prices and fewer buyers are eliminated. With more trading buyers, the limit LPB mechanism also generates higher selling prices and higher social efficiency. The detailed proof is available in the appendix.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a "padding" method for the double-auction mechanism design. Two classes of strategy-proof asymptotically efficient mechanisms are proposed for the bundle/multiunit exchange environment. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first strategy-proof, individually rational, and (weakly) budget-balanced double-auction mechanisms for such a market.
We believe that this work constitutes a useful framework for further development of general double auctions. Possible extensions include mechanism design for markets in which each seller may have fixed cost or supply more than one type of commodity.
Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the online version that can be found at http:// mansci.journal.informs.org/. 
Due to the convexity of the linear program,
Because the optimal solution is x i + x i y j + y j to I J Q for the parametric linear program with Q = q J − 1 + q for 0 < <¯ (Bazaraa et al. 1990) ,
/ is a constant for 0 < <¯ . Let p i denote the infimum of bid price f i such that under the parametric linear program with Q = q J − 1 + q, the optimal solution x i + x i y j + y j satisfies x i = 1 and x i = 0 for sufficiently small > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. If f i < p i , for arbitrary > 0, we can find 0 <¯ < such that in the optimal solution x i + x i y j + y j to I J q J − 1 + q for 0 < <¯ , x i + x i < 1. Because x i + x i < 1 in the optimal solution to I J q J − 1 + q , f i ≤ p i I J q J − 1 + q for sufficiently small > 0.
As this holds for arbitrary
If f i > p i , the optimal solution x i + x i y j + y j to the parametric linear program I J q J − 1 + q satisfies x i = 1 and x i = 0 for sufficiently small > 0. That is, f i ≥ p i I J q J − 1 + q for sufficiently small > 0. As this holds for arbitrary f i > p i , p i ≥ lim sup ↓0 p i I J q J − 1 + q .
Therefore, p i = lim ↓0 p i I J q J − 1 + q .
Theorem 7. For arbitrary positive limit vector q = q c c∈C , the limit LPB padding mechanism is at least as efficient as the BC-LP mechanism. Furthermore, each agent's payoff under the limit LPB padding mechanism is at least as high as that under the BC-LP mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 7. Because both mechanisms implement the most efficient allocation according to the optimal solution to P Ĩ J , to show that the limit LPB padding mechanism is at least as efficient as the BC-LP mechanism, it suffices to show thatĨ BC-LP , the trading buyer set under the BC-LP mechanism, is a subset ofĨ LPBP , the trading buyer set under the limit LPB padding mechanism. for −¯ < < 0. Consider > 0 such that < min ¯ ¯ .
Recall that the optimal solution is x i + x i y j + y j for the parametric linear program with 0 < <¯ , V /2 0 = 
When k ∈Ĩ BC-LP , p k I J > 0. Therefore, p k I J q > 0, and the constraint x k ≤ 1 is binding for I J q . That is, x k + x k = 1 in the optimal solution x i + x i y j + y j to I J q for 0 < <¯ . Thus, k ∈Ĩ LPBP , because x k = 1 and x k = 0.
The limit LPB padding mechanism is at least as efficient as the BC-LP mechanism because both mechanisms implement the most efficient allocation according to the optimal solution to P Ĩ J and because the trading buyer set under the BC-LP mechanism,Ĩ BC-LP , is a subset ofĨ LPBP , the trading buyer set under the limit LPB padding mechanism. Now, we show that the buyer's buying price under the limit LPB padding mechanism is at least as low as that under the BC-LP mechanism. Recall that for trading buyer k in the BC-LP mechanism, the trading price is f i − p k I J . Also, p k I J q is a constant for 0 < <¯ by Proposition 2, and the trading price under the limit LPB padding mechanism is f i − p k I J q by Proposition 3. Each buyer's buying price under the limit LPB padding mechanism is therefore at least as low as that under the BC-LP mechanism.
Finally, we show that the seller's selling price under the limit LPB padding mechanism is at least as high as that under the BC-LP mechanism. For any seller k, recall that for both mechanisms, buyer i in the trading buyer set acquires her bundle in both Ĩ J and Ĩ J \ k . Therefore, for trading seller k in the BC-LP mechanism, the trading price is the lowest i∈Ĩ BC-LP q c k i th ask price of commodity c k from sellers other than k. In the limit LPB padding mechanism, the trading price is the lowest . Each seller's selling price under the limit LPB padding mechanism is therefore at least as high as that under the BC-LP mechanism.
